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COMMENTS I
THE REVIVAL OF BILLS OF PARTICULARS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
Fleming James, Jr. *
T HE Federal Rules of Civil Procedure originally made
grudging provision for bills of particulars. In 1948 even
that grudging provision was eliminated. I will make three in-
quiries: (i) whether recent decisions are not reviving bills of par-
ticulars, in form full-blown, although under another name; (2)
whether such revival, if it is taking place, is warranted by the
rules; and (3) whether it is a good or bad thing.
I
Soon after the rules went into effect the question arose whethei
a party could be compelled by interrogatories (under rule 33) or
requests for admission (under rule 36) to state the details of his
claim or contention of fact. Most of the early cases held he could
not be; 1 but there has been a recent tendency on the part of courts
and commentators to favor compelling such a statement.2 Typical
recent rulings require a party to specify the particulars of a claim
of negligence,3 contributory negligence,4 assumption of the risk,5
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School, 1957-1958. A.B. Yale, 1925, LL.B., 1928.
'E.g., Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Caggiano
v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 240 (D. Mass. 1939). But cf. Bush v. Skidis,
8 F.R.D. 561 (E.D. Mo. 1948) (more specific statement of negligence allegation or-
dered although discovery denied).
24 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 33-17 (2d ed. 1950) ; 2 BARROx & HOLTZOYF,
FEDERAL PRACrICE & PROCEDURE § 768, at 437 n.88 (i95o). But see Cleary, The Uses
of Pleading, 40 Ky. L.J. 46, 49-50 ('95').
' Robinson v. Tracy, 16 F.R.D. I3 (W.D. Mo. z954); Gerber v. United States
Lines Co., 15 F.R.D. 5oo (S.D.N.Y. '954).
' Kyker v Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Pres-
can v. Aliquippa & So. R.R., 16 F.R.D. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Forsythe v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 15 F.R.D. 191 (W.D. Pa. I954); Furmanek v. Southern Trading
Co., i5 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
5 Furmanek v. Southern Trading Co., supra note 4.
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and estoppel. 6 In the case of Alaska v. The Arctic Maid 7 the
plaintiff, seeking to recoyer back taxes, propounded the following
interrogatory to the defendant, who was alleging the invalidity of
the tax:
Indicate by specific factual situations connected with any or all
of your operations in waters north of Dixon Entrance between
1949 through 1954, how the tax
(b) abridges, impairs, and/or denies your right to take or pre-
serve fish in waters in which fishing is permitted by the Secretary
of the Interior,
(d) constitutes an attempted taking of your property and a
denial of your right to fish and preserve fish.
The district judge, concluding that the defendant's answer would
"limit the subjects of controversy, or narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties . . ." overruled the defendant's ob-
jection to the interrogatory.
Let us compare such recent rulings with orders for bills of par-
ticulars. The substance of what is sought is the same. These rul-
ings do not call for facts as a witness would give them, from ob-
servation or knowledge, but for the contentions or claims of fact
selected, combined, and stated in terms of their legal consequences,
as a pleader would set them forth. Contentions need not rest on a
party's personal knowledge or observation,8 nor reflect the party's
own selection or judgment. Indeed they will often represent in-
stead the work product of his lawyer.9 Of just such stuff are bills
of particulars made.10
I Gagen v. Northam Warren Corp., xg F.R.D. 44 (S.D.T.Y. 1953). But see
Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 537 (D. Del.
1954).
7 135 F. Supp. 164 (D. Alaska '955).
' Cf. Clark, The Bar and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure, 25 A.BA.J.
22, 23 (1939).
' Disclosure of specifications of defendant's claims was denied on this ground in
Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 537 (D. Del.
1954). See also the statement of Judge Clark, "When you ask for questions under
Rule 33 you are asking them of the man who knows. [Pleadings are] . . . simply
the process of sounding off by the other man, the man who has some hopes that he
is going to show a case." AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTI-
TUTE ON FEDERAL RULES or CIVIL PROCEDURE 44 (1939) (hereinafter cited as IN-
sTITUTE). "I think that as to these preliminary papers- the lawyer's papers, not
the parties-it is really a waste of time to try to bolster them with these pre-
liminary proceedings." Id. at 242.
10 See Green v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 211 Fed. 774 (D.NJ. I914) ; Htyhurst
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Interrogatories or requests for admission which are directed to
the contentions set forth in a pleading may be filed at any time
after the pleading itself has been filed." These devices do not de-
lay the closing of the pleadings and will often be resorted to after
the issues are closed. In this respect these discovery devices do
differ from the bill of particulars provided for in rule 12 (e) as it
stood originally.'" But they do not differ from the practice which
prevails in some states and which did prevail in the federal courts
before the rules. Under this practice requests for bills of par-
ticulars ordinarily come after issue closed, and do not prolong the
pleading stage. 3
Answers to interrogatories or admissions do not become part of
the pleadings, while bills of particulars did so under rule 12 (e) as
it was originally framed. 4 Under the practice in some states, how-
ever, including New York, the bill of particulars does not become
part of the pleadings. 5 Moreover the practical significance for
present purposes of any difference there may be in this regard is
not great, since presumably such answers will be just as effective
to limit proof as a bill of particulars would be.
It is true that the rules governing depositions and discovery do
not forbid variance between the pretrial answer and what is shown
at trial. In the nature of things, however, a man who describes
v. O'Rourke, iS5 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 19g6) (contributory negligence); Holmes
v. Cook, 156 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (rules, regulations, and ordinances
claimed to have been violated); N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 1x6.
"x Rule 33 allows interrogatories to be served "after the commencement of the
action and without leave of the court," with an exception if service is made by
the plaintiff within ten days after such commencement. Since plaintiff's interroga-
tories would be directed to claims made in the answer, this exception would have
little, if any significance here. Rule 36 contains similar provisions governing re-
quests for admission.
12 Under the original provisions, a motion for a bill of particulars was to be
filed "before responding to a pleading." Rule 12(a) provided that the filing of such
a motion would postpone the time for filing an answer until ten days after the
denial of the motion or, if the motion is granted, until ten days after service of the
bill of particulars.
1" See United States v. Union Metallic Cartridge Co., 265 Fed. 349, 354 (D.
Conn. 1920); Gross v. Price, 208 Misc. 899, 148 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 955);
Ilsen, Recent Cases and New Developments in Federal Practice and Procedure, 16
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1 (1941).
14 The last sentence of rule 12 (e) originally read: "A bill of particulars becomes
part of the pleading which it supplements.'
15 3 CARMODY, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 1115, at 2446 (2d ed. 1931); see Harmon
v. Alfred Peats Co., 243 N.Y. 473, 154 N.E. 314 (1926); Loprieno v. Rudich, 172
Misc. 1i6, 14 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939).
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facts on trial differently from the way he described them before
trial will have to explain the change in description and may be
charged with having committed perjury on one of the occasions.
But claims or contentions are not true or false in the same sense;
and the sanctions which impel a man to tell the truth and, thus,
usually deter him from changing his testimony, do not have as strong
a tendency to keep him from changing his contentions. Yet if a man
is free to change his contentions, little is to be gained from com-
pelling their statement. Those who favor such compulsion have in
view the narrowing of issues and limiting of proof. 6 This aim can
be attained only if the answers to interrogatories are binding upon
the parties unless amended just as in the case of bills of partic-
ulars. This is in effect the proposal of Professor Moore."
The answers to interrogatories and admissions are obtainable
without court order unless the party from whom they are sought
files objections to them.'" Substantially the same thing has been
true of the bill of particulars under the New York practice since
1936, two years before the federal rules went into effect. 19
In all essentials, then, the practice of eliciting detailed conten-
tions of fact by discovery devices is the same as the practice of
eliciting such contentions by bills of particulars after the closing
of issue.
II
Is such a practice consistent with the spirit and framework of
the rules?
One of the great battles of modern procedure has been over how
much detail to require in pleadings.2 0  From the beginning the
" See, e.g., Kyker v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Tenn.
z9g5); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 14 F.R.D. 408 (S.D.N.Y. i953).
17 4 MooRE:, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 33.29, at 2344-46 (2d ed. 195o). In Kendall v.
Tetley Tea Co., 81 F. Supp. 387 (D. Mass. 1948), the court refused to allow plain-
tiff to amend its answer to an interrogatory specifying its claim in a patent suit. In
Gerber v. United States Lines Co., i5 F.R.D. 5oo (S.D.N.Y. I954), however, the
court allowed the defendant to seek particulars of negligence by means of interroga-
tories in order to give it "some indication of plaintiff's present information about
the cause of the accident without foreclosing plaintiff from relying on any addition-
al information which may be uncovered later." Id. at soi.
See FED. R. CiV. P. 33, 36.
See N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. iis-i6; 2 N.Y. JmDiCLAL CouNCiL ANN. REP. I50-52
(1936); CLARK, CODE PLEADNo § 54, at 341 n.152 (2d ed. 1947).
2035 CORNELL L.Q. 888, 89o (i95o). Compare Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been committed to the no-
tion that pleadings should be short, plain, and general.21 This
notion was implemented by the broad provisions of rule 8, by the
studied omission from that rule of words and phrases occasionally
associated with detailed pleadings,22 and by illustrative forms ap-
pended to the rules.
23
With this end in view, the Advisory Committee in drafting the
rules rejected the existing federal and prevailing state practice
(including the New York practice) of bills of particulars after is-
sue closed, and assimilated bills of particulars to the motion for
more definite statement to be made before responding to a plead-
ing. The purpose of the motion was "to enable [movant] . . .
properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial." 25
Almost at once controversy arose among the lower federal
courts about the meaning of this rule. A few courts ordered par-
ticulars freely,26 but the majority "rigorously refused to grant par-
ticulars . . . and in effect eliminated the words 'to prepare for
744 (2d Cir. 1944), with Kramer v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 311 Mo. 369,
383, 279 S.W. 43, 47 (1925).
The case for general pleading is developed in Cr.Ksu, CODE PLEADING § 38, at
231-45 (2d ed. 1947); 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fff 8.02, 8.03 (2d ed. 1948);
Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 CoL m. L. REv. 416
(1921). The case for more detailed pleading is developed in Claim or Cause of
Action, x3 F.R.D. 253 (1953) (discussion of amendment of rule 8(a)(2) recom-
mended by Judicial Conference of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit); McCaskill,
The Modern Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A.J.
123 (1952).
21 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); see INsTITUTE 41.
22 The typical language of the earlier codes required the pleader to set forth "the
facts constituting the cause of action." See CLRKc, CODE PLEADING § 35, at 210 (2d
ed. 1947). Rule 8(a) "was deliberately drafted to avoid this terminology because of
the gloss of technical decisions that have grown up in New York and some other
code states around the words 'facts' and 'cause of action'." Tolman, Advisory Com-
mittee's Proposals To Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 A.B.A.J. 843,
844 (x954). The Advisory Committee rejected a proposal to reintroduce this lan-
guage into rule 8(a). ADvisoRY CommTTE ON RULEs FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRE-
amwARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AmdEND MENTS 8-9 (1954). See also Wright, Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VA.
L. REV. 521, 549-51 (i954).
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
2" See Ilsen, Recent Cases and New Developments in Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, 16 ST. Jome's L. REv. 1, 2 (1941).
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), 308 U.S. 678 (1939).
21 See x MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.07, at 286-94 (ist ed. Supp. 1946) (col-
lecting cases) ; 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 12.17, at 2279 (2d ed. 1948).
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trial' .... ,, 27 In 1946 the Advisory Committee recommended
an amendment eliminating the bill of particulars and the contro-
versial words "to prepare for trial." The amendment was adopted,
and became effective in 1948.28
From this brief history it looks very much as though the essence
of the currently emerging practice was carefully weighed and re-
jected by the Committee and the Court.
Against such a conclusion it might be urged that while the
framers of the rules chose general pleadings, they did provide for
disclosure of factual details through the deposition-discovery prac-
tice in the post-pleading stages of a case; that full discovery was
thought necessary to complement general pleading; 29 and that the
emerging practice simply carries out this policy. But if anything
so nearly identical in function and operation with a rejected de-
vice was meant to survive, surely there should be some rather clear
indication of that intention. There is not; what indications there
are ppint the other way. For one thing, answers to interrogatories
or denials of matters of which an admission is requested must be
made under oath. This is appropriate enough for facts which a
person thinks he knows or has observed. As to such facts he will
either lie or tell the truth as he believes it. A claim which does not
rest on the claimant's personal knowledge stands in a different
position. The relevant concept here is good faith rather than ve-
racity. The claimant can know at most only whether he intends in
good faith to present the claim at trial, and even this may be
largely a matter for his lawyer's judgment. No question of the
party's veracity may be present."0 The rules reflect this difference;
generally they do not require pleadings to be verified, and this in-
cludes more definite statements and included bills of particulars
before they were eliminated. The guarantee of good faith in
setting forth contentions is quite appropriately the attorney's sig-
nature rather than the party's oath.3'
Again, rule 36 permits a request to admit the genuineness of
relevant documents or the truth of relevant matters of fact. This
language does not aptly describe a device to make a party specify
the details of his claim though it may justify calling on him indi-
27 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 54, at 342 (2d ed. 1947).
28 2 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f1 12-17, at 2292 (2d ed. 1948).
21 See 2 id. f1 8.13, at 1652; Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 468 (1943).
20 See INSTITUTE 44, 242.
31 See FED. R. CIrv. P. I.
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rectly to abandon a claim which depends upon the truth or falsity
of the document or fact in question.
All this suggests that the deposition-discovery devices were in-
tended to reach information and not claims or contentions.32
It is true, of course, that a principal purpose of discovery pro-
cedure is to narrow the issues at trial. But it does not follow that
discovery devices were meant to do everything which will narrow
issues. Clearly, for example, discovery may not be used to compel
an election of remedies." Discovery will narrow the issues by af-
fording full disclosure of facts and, perhaps, by requiring aban-
donment of issues which a pleader does not intend in good faith
to contest. But there is no indication that discovery was meant
to narrow the issues through bringing in by a side door a device
which in everything but name so nearly duplicates the rejected
New York bill-of-particulars practice.
It is also true that at the pretrial hearing the court is expressly
invited to get the parties to consider "the simplification of the is-
sues." 34 It may be urged that this shows the rules were designed
to compel detailed statements of claim on the eve of trial, and
that, if such statements are desirable then, the sooner the better;
so that the rules should be construed to authorize the compulsion
of such statements at an early stage by some appropriate device. 35
To this, two things should be said: (i) The word "simplification"
is not apt to describe the process of going into greater detail; in-
deed it suggests quite the opposite.36 It is scarcely clear therefore
that rule i6 contemplates the compelling of particulars. (2) Even
if rule i6 is to be construed as justifying insistence on detailed
statements of claim shortly before trial and after full opportunity
for the discovery of information, it by no means follows that
" Judge Clark has referred to discovery devices as being designed to elicit "ma-
terial . . . in the field of evidence," INsrrUTz 245, from "the man who knows,"
id. at 44. See also Clark, The Bar and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure,
22 A.B.A.J. 22, 23 (1939); 35 CORNELL L.Q. 888, 892 (195o) (discovery devices
"of little assistance in discovering the contentions-the theories - of the parties").
' The rules have jettisoned the doctrine of election of remedies. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(e)(2), iS(a), 20(a) ; Walla v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co., 17 F.R.D. So6
(D. Neb. 1955); 2 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTiCE ff 2.0631 (2d ed. X948).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
25 See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 33.17, at 2312 (2d ed. ig5o).
" It may, however, be claimed that general allegations, by their very breadth,
conceal complexity; 'that detailed allegations, while havipg the superficial appear-
ance of greater complexity, in fact, simplify the claim by narrowing it. I sug-




parties are to be tied down to detail virtually at the pleading stage
as bills of particulars would do. Often, perhaps usually in acci-
dent litigation, a pleader's claims will concern his adversary's con-
duct.S' Especially in such cases there is a substantial difference
between compelling particulars before and after an opportunity
to probe the adversary's sources of information.8
III
Whether or not the federal rules as they now stand warrant
using discovery devices to compel detailed statements of claim,
the question remains whether there should be some' device for
doing this, be it called interrogatory, request for admission, or bill
of particulars.
Before we get to the merits of this question, a false objection
to such devices should be noted and disposed of. It is that dis-
covery devices are unavailable for this purpose because they may
not be used to compel a party to give his opinions.3 9 We need not
inquire whether parties may probe each other's opinions. We are
suggesting a distinction between the use of discovery devices to
secure information and their use to ascertain contentions; and the
contentions which a party's lawyer will urge in court are a differ-
ent sort of thing from opinions which that party or his witnesses
may hold as individuals.4"
Half truth lies in another objection, namely that particulars of
the movant's own conduct are unnecessary because the movant
knows what his conduct was. A partial answer to this is that the
movant is seeking not information about his own conduct but
rather the pleader's contentions about his conduct.41 But the an-
"' This is true, for example, of all the cases cited in notes 3 and 4 supra.
3 8 Thus, some courts refused to require bills of particulars when the movant
himself had much of the relevant information until after opportunity for discovery.
Meehan v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 27 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Graham v.
New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 25 F. Supp. 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (dictum); see
CrxX, CoDE PLEADING § 54, at 342 n.I54 (2d ed. 1947).
" Some early cases sustained objections to interrogatories on this ground. E.g.,
Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Doucette v. Howe,
I F.R.D. i8 (D. Mass. 1939); cf. Babcock & Wilson Co. v. North Carolina Pulp
Co., 25 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D. Del. 1938).
40 Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., i6 F.R.D. 350 (D.D.C.
1954) ; Tinker & Rasor v. Pipeline Inspection Co., i6 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Mo. 1954);
Dugan v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 35 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. I940).
41 See O-So-Ezy Mop Co. v. Channell Chemical Corp., 230 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1915); Caskey & Young, The Bill of Particulars-A Brief for the Defendant, 27
VA. L. REv. 472, 476 (I94i).
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swer does not wholly meet the objection. The movant in such a
case should be compelled to give discovery of his information be-
fore he may tie the pleader down to a detailed statement of
claim.42 This will add extra steps to the discovery process and in-
vite "shadow boxing" and "Fabian tactics," designed not to elicit
more information from the parties but only to perfect the law-
yers' "paper" statements.4 3 But this objection, though not wholly
answered, does not go to the heart of the matter.
The real objection to requiring detailed statements of conten-
tions is that they tie a party down in such a way that he may be
deprived of his substantive rights.44 This is so because even as-
tute counsel are unable always to forecast the vicissitudes of liti-
gation. Time and again some evidence, or some combination of
evidence, will emerge for the first time on trial, or will be per-
ceived in its full significance for the first time on trial by the
party concerned, or by the tribunal.
True, the discovery devices will and should reduce the possi-
bility of surprise, but they cannot eliminate it. At the trial all the
witnesses and evidence are brought together for the first time, and
this fact itself may act as a catalyst for eliciting new information
and (probably more often) for revealing new insights into the sig-
nificance and the relationship of things already known. More-
over, at the trial a fresh and most important point of view is
brought into play for the first time - that of the tribunal, which
is to find and evaluate the facts in terms of the legal theories it
finds applicable.45
42 See note 38 supra.
43 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 54, at 341-42 (2d ed. 1947). Examples of such
shadow boxing may be seen in Bloom v. Bush Terminal Co., 164 N.Y. Supp. 895
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., i8o App. Div. 883, 166 N.Y. Supp. 1o87 (1917); Losie v.
Royal Indemnity Co., 179 App. Div. 439, 165 N.Y. Supp. 999 (193[7); Zecchini v.
Mayer, x95 App. Div. 423, i86 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1921).
44 Cf. Clark, Simplified Pleadings, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943) ("often leads to a
denial of justice to the client for the mistake of his lawyer") ; Wood, Bills of Par-
ticulars in Actions Based Upon Negligence, 49 CENT. LJ. 362, 363 (1899).
" One of the premises - usually unstated - of the practice of holding the
parties to detailed statements of contentions is that the role of the judge in an
adversary system is that of an umpire to pass upon the contentions put to him by
the parties. A different view perceives in the judge's role a responsibility to take
some initiative to see that parties get their substantive rights. This view may be
perfectly consistent with the principle and many of the limitations of the adversary
system. It need not put on the court the job of initiating investigation or litiga-
tion. It may confine the court to controversies put before it by the parties. But it
would not require a court to stultify itself by responding only to the contentions
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The question, then, is how to resolve the problem of the uncer-
tainty which is inseparable from litigation. Shall its risks be put
upon the party who has not had detailed notice of the new possi-
bility, or on the party whose substantive right it unexpectedly
supports? 46
The case for giving judgment according to the substantive law
and the facts found to be true by the trier need not be labored.
The proponents of detailed particulars would concede it. But
they urge that their proposal will narrow the issues and thereby
promote administrative efficiency and minimize possible unfair-
ness to the adversary.47 And they suggest that the danger of sub-
stantive injustice can be avoided by amendment .4  Let us exam-
ine these arguments.
Administrative efficiency is of course an important objective
of procedure. But it must never be forgotten that the ultimate
aim of all procedure should be to secure people their just deserts
under the true facts and the appropriate substantive law. The
course of law reform is strewn with discarded rules that offered
efficiency by narrowing the issues at the cost of justice - witness
election of remedies 11 and the common-law rules that demanded
production of a single issue on which a case had to stand or fall
without opportunity to repair the errors of counsel." Rules which
tie a party down to detailed statements of claim would have this
vice even if they were efficient; but it is not at all clear that they
have the virtue of efficiency.
Administrative efficiency will, to be sure, be promoted by the
narrowing of issues, at least if they stay narrow. When discovery
devices or a pretrial conference elicit the testimony which will be
given at the trial, or an admission that a party intends to abandon
contest of an issue made by the pleadings, this purpose will no
doubt be served. But experience has shown two reasons why de-
tailed statements of claim fail to promote efficiency to the same
of counsel of varying degrees of competence. It is submitted that the latter is the
better view.
46 See 35 CONELL L.Q. 888, 893 (1950) (concluding, "Neither way dispenses
equal justice.").
"' See, e.g., Alaska v. The Arctic Maid, I35 F. Supp. 164 (D. Alaska 1955).
48 See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 33.17, at 2312 (2d ed. i95O); Cf. 2 id.
J 33.29[2] (2d ed. 7948).
49 See note 33 supra.
5 See CLARE, CoDE PLEAIG § 4 (2d ed. 1947). See generally STEPHEN, PLEAD-
ING *136-49, *285-316, *491-99.
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extent: (i) The pleader will seek to protect himself by specify-
ing all the details which his imagination suggests as possibilities
under the facts which he thinks will or may appear at trial.5'
Thus the detailed statement of contentions may be just as broad
as the general pleading, and much more cumbersome. (2) If,
however, the pleader has failed to specify some particular conten-
tion which would have been within the compass of a generalized
pleading and which finds unexpected support or appreciation at
trial, then the court is frequently put in a dilemma: It must either
refuse to decide the case on the true facts and applicable law, or
it must disrupt administrative efficiency to allow a continuance."2
Either resolution of the dilemma represents an evil. Does fairness
to the adversary require this price?
Under the federal rules each party has general notice from the
pleadings of the limits of controversy, and full access through dis-
covery devices to all the information and sources of information
available to both sides. Each party then knows the framework
within which he has to work, and he knows that his adversary
may urge his claims and the tribunal may derive its conclusions
only from permutations and combinations of facts and legal
theories within that framework. A plaintiff, for instance, is en-
titled to know whether he is charged with contributory negligence
and to know the nature of all the sources of information about his
conduct and the surrounding circumstances. He is also entitled
to have that information. This will narrow the issues a great deal
since the nature of the facts themselves will impose severe limits
on what may plausibly be claimed.
" See INSTITUTE 44-45; MORGAN, SoME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLo-
Amm-mrcAN SYsTRm OF LITIGATION 27 (1956). It may be urged that the requirement
of answering interrogatories under oath will prevent such a practice. But since the
kind of interrogatory in question seeks the lawyer's claims rather than his own
knowledge, the oath is inappropriate. Cf. p. 1478 supra. All that can be re-
quired here is the lawyer's good faith, and historically this has not kept lawyers
from making shotgun allegations.
52 35 COarE.L L.Q. 888, 893 (195O); Cf. ITUT 46. It is not contended
that a continuance will always be needed when an amendment is called for, or that
a continuance would never be needed when amendment is unnecessary. Certainly,
even under a system of general pleading, the trial court should have discretion to
prevent prejudice resulting from genuine surprise, without regard to the technical
rules of variance. It is submitted, however, that genuine surprise will more often
exist, and a claim of surprise -whether or not genuine-will more often seem
plausible to the court under a system that entitles parties to rely on specific de-




Further, full discovery of information puts both parties (or
their lawyers) in the same position to see what contentions are
warranted by the facts. This equalization of the parties enhances
the effectiveness of the adversary system to administer justice.
In the ordinary case dealing with a single occurrence or transac-
tion like an accident or a breach of contract, where the issues lie
within a reasonably narrow compass, it is submitted that fairness
to the pleader's adversary requires no more than this.
It may be urged that the adversary should have particulars so
as to save him from the unreasonable burden in pretrial prepara-
tion of collecting facts upon which no issue will be made. But in
many contexts this contention is unrealistic. In accident cases
particularly, the adversary's burden will not be alleviated very
much by particulars, even when they are not of the shotgun vari-
ety. Defendants are nearly always insured or large self-insur-
ers.5 3 Those who conduct their defense are familiar with the ap-
plicable substantive law and seek to have the accident thoroughly
investigated as quickly as possible, well before suit is begun, with
a view to careful appraisal of the claim's settlement value as well
as to the more remote possibility of litigation. 4 On the other side
5 3 This is obviously true in Massachusetts and New York where there is com-
pulsory liability insurance for automobiles. It is also true in other states. Studies
have shown that those persons who have no insurance seldom make any significant
payment for the injuries they have caused. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMe-
PENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 53-96 (1932); James & Law, Compensation
for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CoNN. B.J.
7o, 75 (1952).
5' [W]hat actual difference can it make to a defendant who has prepared his
case as it should be, whether or not the plaintiff specifies that defendant failed
to sound a horn? . . . The actual preparation for each side will be the same,
however such details are finally to be understood ....
Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 489 (1923).
For detailed practical accounts of how an accident should be investigated, see
STEVENSON, INVESTIGATION Or NEGLIGENCE CASES SmI'wl=En (1949); GoRTON,
AUTOMOBILE CLAIM PRACTICE (1940); Heyl, What a Trial Lawyer Should Find in
anInvestigation File, 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 56 (1954); Vogel, Preparation and Trial
of a Personal Injury Case by the Defendant, 3 J. PUB. L. 537 ('954). All of these
accounts stress the paramount importance of prompt and thorough investigations.
See GoRToN, op. cit. supra at 22, 38-39; STEVENSON, op. cit. supra at 4; Heyl,
supra at 57.
Also emphasized is the need for full detailed statements from all available wit-
nesses covering all relevant aspects of the case. See STEVENSON, op. cit. supra at 2;
Heyl, supra at 66; Vogel, supra at 537 (stressing also the importance of complete
investigation for settlement purposes).
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plaintiffs' attorneys can scarcely afford to neglect a prompt and
thorough investigation of their clients' conduct.
The adversary would like, of course, to tie the pleader's con-
tentions down to fine detail.55 The plaintiff in our illustration, for
instance, would like to have the defendant specify the alleged con-
duct on plaintiff's part which the defendant will contend was
negligent. But once the parties have been put on an equal foot-
ing, the appeal is less one for fairness than for tactical advantage.
The requirement of further particulars of a claim would enable
the adversary to prevent the tribunal from giving judgment on
the substantive merits whenever the pleader has failed accurately
to forecast the course of trial. This carries the implications of the
adversary system too far.
It is urged, however, that substantive injustice may be avoided
by allowing particulars to be amended at trial.5 6 If they were
freely amendable, this objection would be met, but the right of
amendment would also take away whatever value particulars
might have in promoting efficiency or fairness. If on the other
hand conditions are to be put on amendment, then the additional
protection for the adversary will frequently have to be bought
at the cost either of injustice or of inefficiency.
On balance it seems that the judgment made by the architects
of the federal rules was a sound one, at least in the ordinary case.
The strongest argument for particulars can be made in litigation
which calls into controversy a long and complicated course of
conduct.5
7
5 Comment, 32 YALE LJ. 483, 489 (1923).
'o See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 9 33.17, at 2312 (2d ed. 195o).
' See generally Caskey & Young, The Bill of Particulars-A Brief for the De-
fendant, 27 VA. L. REV. 472 (1941).
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